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DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE REVIEW: 
WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IN 
COREY STRAYED FROM PRECEDENT AND 
WHAT THE SUPREME COURT COULD 
HAVE DONE ABOUT IT 
HWI HAROLD LEE* 
Abstract: In 2007, the California state legislature enacted the Low-Carbon 
Fuel Standard, or LCFS, limiting carbon emissions from transport fuels 
throughout the fuels’ entire “lifecycle,” by assigning “carbon intensity” scores 
to each fuel product. These scores are calculated using a variety of measure-
ments, including the amount of carbon emitted while producing the fuels and 
in transporting them to California. Out-of-state fuel suppliers challenged that 
the LCFS places an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce because 
their products would inevitably have higher carbon intensity scores than their 
in-state counterparts, based merely on the distance traveled. The dispute 
reached the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union v. Corey. This Comment argues that although the Ninth Cir-
cuit correctly found the LCFS to be valid under the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, it erred in finding that the text of the LCFS’s was not facially discrim-
inatory, which would have required the court to have applied strict scrutiny. 
This Comment further argues that the Supreme Court should have granted cer-
tiorari to provide a clear instruction on whether a Dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis could be performed relying solely on the state legislature’s purported 
reasoning, and without regard to the challenged law’s discriminatory text. 
INTRODUCTION 
Coping with historic droughts has become an inevitable task for Cali-
fornians.1 On April 22, 2014, the U.S. Drought Monitor announced that for 
the first time in fifteen years, it observed every square inch of California to 
be suffering from moderate-to-severe drought.2 The National Aeronautics 
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2014–2015. 
 1 See Press Release, Cal. Office of Governor, Governor Brown Issues Executive Order to 
Streamline Approvals for Water Transfers to Protect California’s Farms (May 20, 2013), available 
at http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=18048, archived at http://perma.cc/P2X3-YVWW. 
 2 U.S. Drought Monitor Update for April 22, 2014, NOAA NAT’L CLIMATIC DATA CTR. (Apr. 
22, 2014), https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/news/us-drought-monitor-update-april-22-2014, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6Y8G-KN4J. 
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and Space Administration (NASA) also reported that the periods three, six, 
and twelve months prior to January 2014 were “all the driest periods in Cal-
ifornia since record-keeping started in 1885.” 3  From February 1, 2013 
through January 31, 2014, the state received less than seven inches of pre-
cipitation.4 By contrast, the average annual precipitation in California is 
over twenty-two inches.5 Such an unusual dry season, if it continues, could 
devastate the state’s $44.7 billion agricultural industry6 and further impact 
citizens’ lives by causing long term problems such as severe water shortag-
es, spiking food costs, seawater intrusion, and increased risk of wild fires.7 
Since as early as 2004, some researchers have pointed to global warm-
ing, which has been scientifically proven to be caused by the increasing 
levels of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) in the atmosphere, as a possible cul-
prit for these events.8 In response to the problems caused by global warm-
ing, the California legislature enacted Assembly Bill 32 (“AB-32”): the 
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.9 When it passed AB-32, the Cali-
fornia legislature acknowledged the threat of global warming, stating that it 
“poses a serious threat to the economic well-being, public health, natural 
resources, and the environment of California.”10 
With AB-32, the California legislature enabled the California Air Re-
sources Board (“CARB”) to place limitations on the GHGs emitted by more 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Mike Carlowicz, Drought Stressing California’s Plantscape, NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY 
(Feb. 14, 2014), http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=83124, archived at http://
perma.cc/M66M-8D7A. 
 4 Id. 
 5 See id. 
 6 Andrew Freedman, California Drought: No Relief in Sight, THEGUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2014, 
11:01 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/feb/03/california-drought-no-relief-
in-sight, archived at http://perma.cc/N9LN-L3X8. 
 7 See Tony C. Dreibus et al., Food Prices Surge as Drought Exacts a High Toll on Crops, 
WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2014, http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303287804579445
311778530606, archived at http://perma.cc/S456-QKSU (noting that droughts drive up prices for 
many agricultural goods); The California Drought, USGS CAL. WATER SCI. CTR., http://ca.water.
usgs.gov/data/drought/drought-impact.html (last modified Nov. 20, 2014), archived at http://
perma.cc/BX5F-XEW4 (noting that drought leads to water shortages, seawater intrusion, and 
increased wildfire risk). 
 8 See Joe Romm, Climatologist Who Predicted California Drought 10 Years Ago Says It May 
Soon Be ‘Even More Dire,’ CLIMATEPROGRESS (Mar. 7, 2014, 12:26 PM), http://thinkprogress.org/
climate/2014/03/07/3370481/california-drought/, archived at http://perma.cc/BJ8H-67QZ (citing 
Jacob O. Sewall & Lisa Cirbus Sloan, Disappearing Arctic Sea Ice Reduces Available Water in the 
American West, 31 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS, no. 6, 2004, at 1, 1, available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2003GL019133/pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7WFV-
L66W (predicting that disappearing arctic ice, caused by climate change, would cause drought in the 
American west)). 
 9 2006 Cal. Stat. 89 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 38500–38599 (West 
2007)). 
 10 See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. 
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014) (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(a)). 
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than 33 million motor vehicles registered and operating in the state.11 In 
2007, CARB enacted the innovative Low-Carbon Fuel Standard (“LCFS”), 
which sought to limit the carbon emissions of transport fuels in their entire 
“lifecycles”—from production to consumption—by assigning “carbon in-
tensity” scores to each fuel product sold in California. 12  Because these 
scores would include measuring the carbon emitted during the production 
and transportation of fuels to fuel blenders in California,13 the LCFS has 
become a target of hostile criticism and legal challenges from out-of-state 
fuel suppliers.14 
The effort to repeal the LCFS culminated in Rocky Mountain Farmers 
Union v. Corey, where plaintiffs argued that the LCFS’s reliance on regional 
categories places an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.15 Ac-
cording to the plaintiffs, out-of-state fuel products will inevitably have 
higher carbon intensity scores than in-state products because of the greater 
distances traveled to deliver them. 16 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument in Corey and held that the LCFS is not 
facially discriminatory.17 The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district 
court to consider whether the LCFS discriminates in purpose or in practical 
effect, instructing that if it does not, the lower court is to apply the lenient 
Pike balancing test.18 
This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly found the LCFS 
to be valid under the Dormant Commerce Clause, but that the court arrived 
at its conclusion in reliance of the wrong legal standard.19 Because the text 
of the LCFS is facially discriminatory, the court should have relied on the 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95480 (2010); CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, STATIS-
TICS FOR PUBLICATION: JANUARY THROUGH DECEMBER 2014 (2014), available at http://apps.
dmv.ca.gov/about/profile/official.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QFV8-JK5E (noting that as of 
December 2014, there were 33,550,486 registered vehicles in California). 
 12 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480, 95481(a)(11). 
 13 Measurements of transportation emissions would be based on the distances travelled. See 
id. § 95486 (outlining the methodology used to measure carbon intensity values). 
 14 See Press Release, Renewable Fuels Ass’n, Joint Statement: Ethanol Industry Files to Take 
LCFS Fight to United States Supreme Court (Mar. 20, 2014), available at http://www.ethanolrfa.
org/news/entry/joint-statement-ethanol-industry-files-to-take-lcfs-fight-to-united-states-/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/PUX8-SUQB; Felicity Carus, ‘Clash of the Titans’: California’s Low Carbon 
Fuel Standard Battle, BREAKING ENERGY (May. 2, 2012, 11:30 AM), http://breakingenergy.com/
2012/05/02/clash-of-the-titans-californias-low-carbon-fuel-standard-bat, archived at http://perma.
cc/JP65-DSN9. 
 15 See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1087 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 16 Id. at 1090. 
 17 Id. at 1107. 
 18 Id. (reversing the district court’s decision by finding LCFS’s ethanol provisions were not 
facially discriminatory); see infra notes 63–70 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 88–113 and accompanying text. 
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strict scrutiny test.20 This Comment further argues that the U.S. Supreme 
Court should have granted certiorari because there needs to be a clearer in-
struction on whether a lower court reviewing a Dormant Commerce Clause 
case may ignore the text of a state law and instead rely on the enacting 
state’s purported reasoning to find non-discrimination.21 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
As the first state to enact a law to regulate air pollution from motor ve-
hicles,22 California has been regarded by Congress as a trailblazer in the 
nation’s air pollution control efforts.23 Continuing with that tradition, the 
CARB established the LCFS under executive order S-1-07, issued on Janu-
ary 19, 2007.24 The LCFS was the first mandate in the world to address car-
bon dioxide (CO2) emitted not only from the source, in this case the tailpipe 
of a motor vehicle, but also during the production, transportation, and dis-
tribution of petroleum-based fuels.25 The stated goal of the standard was to 
reduce GHG emissions in California to 1990 levels by 2020.26 
In practice, the LCFS works by requiring fuel suppliers to adjust near-
ly all transportation fuel products used in California to meet an average an-
nual limit of “carbon intensity,” which measures CO2 emitted during the 
entire lifecycle of the fuels, from well to wheels.27 Under the cap-and-trade 
system,28 a producer whose reported carbon intensity scores exceed the al-
lowed annual limit may purchase credits from others whose products aver-
age below the limit.29 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See infra notes 88–113 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 106–113 and accompanying text. 
 22 See KARL B. SCHNELLE, JR. & CHARLES A. BROWN, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL TECH-
NOLOGY HANDBOOK 13 (2001). 
 23 See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013) (quot-
ing Ford Motor Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 606 F.2d 1293, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1979)) (noting that 
Congress allowed California to regulate air pollution with minimal federal oversight). 
 24 CAL. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, EXEC. ORDER NO. S-01-07 (2007), available at http://
www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/eos0107.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KRN7-2GES. 
 25 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95480, 95486 (2010) (noting the purpose of the regulation 
and the methodology for calculating carbon intensity); Press Release, Envtl. Def. Fund, California 
Approves World’s First Low Carbon Fuel Standard, Continuing Environmental Leadership (Apr. 
23, 2009), available at http://www.edf.org/news/california-approves-worlds-first-low-carbon-fuel-
standard-continuing-environmental-leadership, archived at http://perma.cc/KA42-3RDD (noting 
that the California LCFS was the world’s first). 
 26 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38550 (West 2007). 
 27 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95482–95483, 95485. 
 28 A cap-and-trade system allows participants to exchange allowance credits as currency in a 
market setting. See Cap and Trade, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/captrade/ 
(last updated May 10, 2012), archived at http://perma.cc/F6CM-4TX2. 
 29 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 95482–95483. 
58 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:E. Supp. 
To satisfy the reporting responsibilities, producers can rely on “Table 
6” of the LCFS, a schedule of the average values of carbon intensity scores, 
or “default pathways,” for each type of fuel sold on the California market.30 
CARB determined the values for each pathway using a modified version of 
the “Greenhouse Gases, Regulated Emissions, and Energy Use in Transpor-
tation” (“GREET”) model called “CA-GREET.”31 This model incorporates 
a blend of scientific factors including the producers’ efficiency of produc-
tion, the type of electricity used to power the plant, the fuel used for thermal 
energy, and the emissions released while transporting the fuel.32 
Transportation emissions are calculated by considering, “(1) distance 
traveled, including distance traveled inside California to the fuel blender[,] 
(2) total mass and volume transported[,] and (3) efficiency of the method of 
transport.”33 Using this model, CARB determined that, on average, Califor-
nia ethanol actually produces more transportation emissions than either 
Brazilian or Midwest counterparts because California does not grow corn 
and must import it, and because corn is heavier and more voluminous than 
refined ethanol.34 Nevertheless, California ethanol results in the least carbon 
intensity scores overall. 35  If, however, a manufacturer finds the non-
specific, region-based categorization under Table 6 to be an unfair or inac-
curate representation of its fuels’ carbon intensity, it could register an indi-
vidualized pathway.36 The LCFS, in other words, provides fuel producers 
with the liberty to choose the most advantageous option.37 
The LCFS caused an uproar among Midwest ethanol suppliers that sell 
their products in California.38 In December 2009, Rocky Mountain Farmers 
                                                                                                                           
 30 Id. § 95486(b)(1) tbl. 6; see Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 
1082 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that fuel suppliers may use Table 6 to report carbon intensity scores). 
 31 See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1081–82. 
 32 Id. at 1083. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. Most domestic ethanol today is made by processing corn. See id. at 1082–83. 
 35 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95486(b)(1) tbl.6 (2010). This is because, among other 
factors, Table 6 assumes that California producers use more energy-efficient technologies, and 
rely on electrical grids that use renewable resources and natural gas that emit less GHGs than the 
coal-fired power plants used primarily in the Midwest. See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1083. 
 36 It can do so using Method 2A or 2B. Corey, 730 F.3d at 1082 (citing CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 
17, § 95486(c), (d)). Under Method 2A, a fuel producer can propose a replacement for one or 
more of the pathway’s average values if it can show that the proposed pathway has a carbon inten-
sity at least a certain amount less than the default pathway, and if it is “expected to supply more 
than [ten] million gasoline-equivalent gallons per year in California.” CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17 
§ 95486(c), (e)(2). Under Method 2B, a producer can propose an entirely new, individualized 
pathway that is not found on the default pathway. Id. § 95486(d). 
 37 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95486(c), (d). 
 38 Op-Ed., California’s Proposed Low Carbon Fuel Standard, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2009, http://
www.latimes.com/opinion/la-ed-lowcarbon20-2009apr20-story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
N6SN-SLBG. 
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Union (“Rocky Mountain”) filed suit against CARB in the District Court 
for the Eastern District of California, raising a constitutional challenge 
against the LCFS’s lifecycle analysis.39 According to Rocky Mountain, be-
cause CO2 emitted during production and transportation is included in the 
calculus of carbon intensity scores, the LCFS significantly disadvantages 
non-Californian ethanol producers and sellers.40 Further, Rocky Mountain 
argued that the categorization of fuels by clearly differentiating between 
ethanol produced in California and ethanol produced in the Midwest is dis-
criminatory,41 and that the alternative reporting pathways under Methods 2A 
and 2B place a discriminatory burden on Midwest industries.42 
On December 29, 2011, the district court granted Rocky Mountain’s 
motion for summary judgment, holding that the LCFS violated the Dormant 
Commerce Clause.43 The court enjoined enforcement of the LCFS for the 
“pendency of the litigation.”44 The court found the ethanol provisions to be 
facially discriminatory, and thus applied strict scrutiny in its consideration 
of the LCFS’s constitutionality.45 Effectively, the court ruled that the lifecy-
cle analysis, which utilizes regional categories and default pathways, is un-
constitutional because the out-of-state fuels unavoidably have higher carbon 
intensity scores largely based on their locations of origin.46 Concluding that, 
pursuant to a strict scrutiny analysis, the LCFS was discriminatory, and that 
the defendants failed to establish that it could not employ a nondiscrimina-
tory alternative, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary 
injunction to prohibit the enforcement of the regulation.47 
CARB timely appealed the district court’s decision to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.48 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
the LCFS treats a fuel by its carbon intensity score, and not by its origin, 
and only considers location “to the extent that location affects the actual 
GHG emissions attributable to a default pathway.”49 The court further held 
that the use of default pathways and regional categories are not discrimina-
tory “because they reflect the reality of assessing and attempting to limit 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene, 843 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1071 (D. Cal. 
2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 
1070 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 40 See id. at 1087. 
 41 See id. at 1090. 
 42 See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1094. 
 43 See Goldstene, 843 F.Supp. 2d at 1078–79. 
 44 Id. at 1079. 
 45 See id. at 1085–87. 
 46 See id. at 1087. 
 47 Id. at 1105. 
 48 Corey, 730 F.3d at 1086. 
 49 Id. at 1089. 
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GHG emissions from ethanol production.”50 The court also vacated the in-
junction and remanded the case to the district court.51 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
There is no constitutional provision that expressly forbids a state from 
enacting laws that burden interstate commerce.52 The U.S. Supreme Court 
has, however, repeatedly inferred such a limitation from the Commerce 
Clause’s grant of the power to the federal government to regulate the inter-
state commerce.53 Dormant Commerce Clause54 jurisprudence has played a 
primary role in restricting the ability of state governments to practice eco-
nomic protectionism and regulations of out-of-state conduct that would oth-
erwise “excite those jealousies and retaliatory measures the Constitution 
was designed to prevent.”55 Today, “a virtually per se rule of invalidity” 
governs if it is established that a state enacted a discriminatory statute that 
protects its economic interests at the cost of burdening interstate com-
merce.56 A discriminatory statute may only overcome the strong presump-
tion of unconstitutionality if the enacting state can show (1) a legitimate 
local purpose that (2) could not be served by a non-discriminatory alterna-
tive.57 
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in 1963 to create a uni-
form law for controlling air pollution.58 It mandates that “no State or any 
political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard 
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor 
                                                                                                                           
 50 Id. at 1093. 
 51 On remand, it instructed the district court to consider whether the LCFS discriminates in 
purpose or practical effect, and if not, to apply the more lenient Pike balancing test. See id. at 
1107; infra notes 63–71 and accompanying text. 
 52 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 53 See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994) (noting that 
the Commerce Clause acts as a grant of authority to Congress and a limitation on the states); WIL-
LIAM J. RICH, 3 MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 34:23 (3rd ed. 2011). See generally Chem. 
Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (holding that Alabama’s waste disposal fee on 
hazardous waste generated out-of-state violated the Commerce Clause); City of Phila. v. New 
Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (holding that New Jersey’s prohibition on out-of-state waste violated 
the Commerce Clause). 
 54 “When Congress has not acted to address a particular issue or activity, the Commerce 
Clause is said to be ‘dormant’ in the context of that issue.” RICH, supra note 53, § 34:23. 
 55 See C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994) (citing THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 143–45 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
 56 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623–24. 
 57 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 139 (1986) (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 
336 (1979)). 
 58 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. 
Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1078 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014). 
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vehicle engines . . . .” 59  In an apparent contradiction, however, section 
209(a) of the CAA exclusively allows California to waive this restriction 
and to create its own anti-pollution rules.60 It also allows other states to 
adopt California’s standards.61 The only requirements for the statutory al-
lowance are that California’s standards “will be, in the aggregate, at least as 
protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal standards,” 
that California’s determination is not arbitrary or capricious, that such 
standards are necessary to “meet compelling and extraordinary conditions,” 
and that the standards are consistent with section 202(a).62 
State laws have been challenged on Dormant Commerce Clause 
grounds several times.63 In these cases, the legality of the state regulation 
hinged on whether the court chose to apply strict scrutiny, or the more leni-
ent Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. balancing test.64 The Supreme Court, in Ore-
gon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, explained 
that discrimination is found where a state statute treats in-state and out-of-
state commercial actors differently, to the benefit of the former and burden 
of the latter.65 Courts will find discrimination if the statute is facially dis-
criminatory or if it is discriminatory in purpose and effect. 66 In Camps 
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, the Court found a tax break 
for summer camps that served primarily in-state campers to be facially dis-
                                                                                                                           
 59 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a). 
 60 Id. § 7543(b). 
 61 See id. 
 62 Id. Section 202(a) sets out the CAA’s emissions and fuel standards. Id. § 7521(a). Such 
deference towards California stems from Congress’s belief in the state’s “pioneering efforts at 
adopting and enforcing motor vehicle emission standards different from and in large measure 
more advanced than the corresponding federal program . . . .” Corey, 730 F.3d at 1079 (quoting 
Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 627 F.2d 1095, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
 63 Specifically, that a state regulation is discriminatory if it treats products differently based 
on state boundaries alone. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 
93, 95 (1994) (challenging a surcharge on waste coming in from out-of-state); Chem. Waste 
Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 336 (1992) (challenging a disposal fee for out-of-state waste); 
City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 618 (1978) (challenging an outright prohibition on the 
import of out-of-state waste). 
 64 See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970). The Pike test considers the bur-
den on interstate commerce, against the state’s interest. See id. at 139–40, 146. If the state interest 
outweighs the burden on commerce, it is permissible. See id. But, if the burden on interstate com-
merce is “clearly excessive,” the law will be struck down as unconstitutional. Id. at 142. Compare 
Hunt, 504 U.S. at 348 (striking down regulation under strict scrutiny review), with United Haulers 
Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (upholding 
county waste flow control ordinances under Pike because the incidental burden on interstate 
commerce was clearly not excessive in relation to local benefits). 
 65 Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 99–100. 
 66 See 520 U.S. 564, 575–76 (1997) (finding a tax break for summer camps serving primarily 
out-of-state children facially discriminatory). 
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criminatory.67 Further, the Court noted that once it is deemed facially dis-
criminatory, there is no need to look at the purpose or effect of the statute.68 
If a state statute is found facially discriminatory, the reviewing court 
must apply the “strictest scrutiny,”69 under which the discrimination is “per 
se unconstitutional unless the state defending the law can demonstrate both 
a legitimate local purpose and that the same purpose could not be served 
through less discriminatory means.”70 If, alternatively, the state law is found 
to be non-discriminatory and to have merely an incidental effect on inter-
state commerce, the Pike balancing test—requiring the claimant to show 
that the “burden on interstate commerce . . . is ‘clearly excessive’ in relation 
to its local benefits”—is to be applied.71 
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Supreme Court held that a 
New Jersey state statute violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. 72 The 
New Jersey legislature had enacted a law that prohibited the importation of 
solid or liquid waste from other states, in an effort to protect its environ-
ment and its citizens’ health.73 Aside from the geographic locations where 
they were collected, the restricted out-of-state waste was no different from 
the waste that originated within state boundaries.74 The Court explained that 
when a state law is facially discriminatory, courts must apply a virtually per 
se rule of invalidity in their review of the legal challenge.75 The Court found 
that, based on this standard, the New Jersey statute was facially discrimina-
tory because the state could not show “some reason, apart from [the prod-
ucts’] origin, to treat them differently.”76 
Similarly, in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, as Massachusetts’s 
dairy farmers began running out of business due to dropping milk prices in 
1992, the Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture issued a pric-
ing order that taxed all raw milk produced out-of-state and used the result-
ing revenue to subsidize its dairy farmers.77 The Supreme Court reversed 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision, holding that the pric-
ing order was a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause because it ben-
                                                                                                                           
 67 See id. 
 68 See id. 
 69 Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979). 
 70 Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 99; see William Griffin, Note, Renewable Portfolio 
Standards and the Dormant Commerce Clause: The Case for In-Region Location Requirements, 
41 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 133, 145 (2014) (citing Oregon Waste Systems, 511 U.S. at 99). 
 71 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
 72 437 U.S. 617, 618 (1978). 
 73 See id. at 629–30. 
 74 See id. at 629. 
 75 See id. at 624. 
 76 See id. at 626–27. 
 77 512 U.S. 186, 188–98 (1994). 
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efitted Massachusetts’s economic interests at the expense of out-of-state 
milk producers.78 
Moreover, in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, Alabama en-
acted a similar statute imposing a fee on hazardous wastes originating in 
other states.79 The Court struck the fee down as unconstitutional, but ex-
plained that there may be an exception when a state demonstrates that its 
protectionist measure has “boundaries and [that] the process of setting them 
reflected genuine attention to the legitimate goals of regulation and not a 
mere hostility to trade.”80 For this exception, the Court cited to its holding in 
Oregon-Washington Railroad & Navigation Co. v. Washington.81 In Ore-
gon-Washington Railroad & Navigation, the Court heard a challenge to 
Washington’s quarantine of certain shipments of alfalfa from neighboring 
states.82 The Court held that because of Washington’s “investigation actual-
ly made into the existence of the weevils and its geographical location,’’ the 
law was “a real quarantine law and not a mere inhibition against importa-
tion . . . .”83 The Court thus held the quarantine did not violate the Com-
merce Clause.84 
In Maine v. Taylor, the Supreme Court came to a rare Dormant Com-
merce Clause finding that a state statute was facially discriminatory and yet 
permissible after passing strict scrutiny.85 The Court found Maine’s ban on 
the importation of live baitfish from other states to protect its fisheries from 
parasites and non-native species, despite being facially discriminatory, was 
constitutional because Maine had shown a legitimate local purpose that 
could not be adequately served by available non-discriminatory alterna-
tives.86 The Court further explained that the evidence showed legitimate 
scientific reasons other than origin to discriminate against out-of-state live 
baitfish, and therefore held the statute was not “a case of arbitrary discrimi-
nation against interstate commerce.”87 
                                                                                                                           
 78 The Court reasoned that the law effectively functioned as a tariff—an unconstitutional 
restriction on interstate commerce. See id. at 194–96, 207. 
 79 504 U.S. 334, 334, 336 (1992). 
 80 Id. at 347 & n.11 (citing Or.-Wash. R.R. & Navigation Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87, 96 
(1926)). 
 81 See id. at 347 & n.11 (citing Or.-Wash. R.R. & Navigation Co., 270 U.S. at 96). 
 82 See Or.-Wash. R.R. & Navigation Co., 270 U.S. at 90–91. Washington had blocked ship-
ments of alfalfa, except in sealed containers, from nearby states whose crops had been suffering 
from alfalfa weevil infestation. See id. at 90–91. Weevils are pest insects that rapidly propagate by 
depositing eggs on the crop plants’ leaves, which, when transported to a different location, can 
infect the growing crop at the new location. Id. at 90. 
 83 Id. at 96. 
 84 See id. 
 85 See 477 U.S. 131, 151–52 (1986). 
 86 Id. at 148, 151. 
 87 Id. at 141–44, 151. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
In Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit held that California’s Low-Carbon Fuel Standard 
(“LCFS”) is not a violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.88 The court 
rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the LCFS is facially discriminatory 
because of its lifecycle analysis requirements, and thus that strict scrutiny 
review must be employed in the judicial review of its challenge.89 In partial 
dissent, Judge Murguia criticized the holding, suggesting the majority erred 
by placing “the cart before the horse [when it considered] California’s rea-
sons for distinguishing between in-state and out-of-state ethanol before ex-
amining the text of the statute to determine if it facially discriminate[s]” 
against out-of-state producers. 90  Judge Murguia cited to Camps New-
found/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, in which he argued, the Su-
preme Court instructed that the determination of whether the text of a regu-
lation itself is discriminatory must come before analyzing “the purported 
reasons for the discrimination.” 91 He contested that the majority should 
have found the LCFS facially discriminatory based on its text, because Ta-
ble 6 clearly differentiates between California and Midwest products, and 
assigns higher carbon intensity scores to the latter.92 
The Ninth Circuit should have found the LCFS facially discriminatory, 
consistent with the dissent’s assertions, because Table 6 and the statutory 
text of the LCFS distinguish between California and Midwest ethanol fuels 
based on regional boundaries.93 As Judge Murguia correctly stated, the Su-
preme Court in Camps Newfound/Owatonna instructed that when the text of 
a statute or regulation expressly distinguishes economic entities based on 
geography, courts need not look any further, the law is facially discrimina-
tory.94 The Camps Newfound/Owatonna instruction does not diverge from 
the Supreme Court’s rule in Oregon Waste Systems Inc. v. Department of 
Environmental Quality that the Dormant Commerce Clause is violated 
where there is simply a “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state 
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.”95 Re-
gardless of the purported reasons that California provided for their struc-
                                                                                                                           
 88 Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. de-
nied, 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014). 
 89 See id. at 1107–08 (remanding to the district court to determine whether strict scrutiny or 
the Pike balancing test should be employed). 
 90 Id. at 1108 (Murguia, J., dissenting). 
 91 Id. (citing 520 U.S. 564, 575–76 (1997)). 
 92 See id. 
 93 See id.; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95486(b)(1) tbl.6 (2010). 
 94 See 520 U.S. at 575–76. 
 95 Id.; Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S 93, 99 (1994). 
2015] Dormant Commerce Clause Review: The Ninth Circuit Decision in Corey 65 
ture, Table 6 and the statutory text plainly distinguish between California 
and Midwest ethanol fuels based on regional boundaries.96 
Had the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the facial discrimination in the 
LCFS, and thus applied strict scrutiny, the law should have nonetheless sur-
vived strict scrutiny review. 97  California readily demonstrated that the 
LCFS serves a legitimate local purpose, thus satisfying the first requirement 
of strict scrutiny review.98 The Supreme Court has allowed certain types of 
otherwise unallowable discrimination where a state seeks to “[guard] 
against imperfectly understood environmental risks, despite the possibility 
that they may ultimately prove to be negligible.”99 By confronting the cata-
strophic threats posed by climate change, California employed allowable 
discrimination due to legitimate concerns about protecting its citizens by 
minimizing transport fuel greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions.100 
California could further show that the aforementioned purpose could 
not be served as well by other available, non-discriminatory means, thereby 
satisfying the second prong of strict scrutiny review.101 The California Air 
Resources Board (“CARB”) successfully explained that the default path-
ways in Table 6 were designed to sort multiple ethanol producers under re-
gional categories so that it could avoid enforcing costly and unnecessary 
individualized determinations for each and every ethanol producer that 
seeks to service the state.102 Further, it was shown that the LCFS also pro-
vided a set of alternative reporting methods for ethanol producers who 
would rather register an individualized pathway.103 Taken together, the de-
fault pathways represented a logical and non-restricting means to allow all 
ethanol producers to efficiently satisfy the reporting requirement, rather 
than a tool to unfairly burden out-of-state products, as argued by the plain-
tiffs.104 As the Supreme Court stated in Maine v. Taylor, “the constitutional 
principles underlying the [C]ommerce [C]lause cannot be read as requiring 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95486(b)(1) tbl.6. 
 97 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 147, 151–52 (1986) (holding that Maine’s desire to 
limit invasive species was a legitimate local interest and that prohibiting the import of baitfish was 
the least discriminatory means of achieving that purpose). 
 98 Corey, 730 F.3d at 1109 (Murguia, J., dissenting) (applying strict scrutiny to the LCFS and 
finding a legitimate local purpose). 
 99 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148. 
 100 See supra notes 8–12 and accompanying text; see also Corey, 730 F.3d at 1109 (Murguia, 
J., dissenting) (finding that reducing GHG emissions is a legitimate local interest). 
 101 Corey, 730 F.3d at 1093; see Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151; Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 
337 (1979). 
 102 See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1093. 
 103 At least one Midwest producer has already done so to achieve the lowest carbon intensity. 
See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1084; CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95486(c), (d) (2010). 
 104 See Corey, 730 F.3d at 1094. 
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[a state] to sit idly by and wait until potentially irreversible environmental 
damage has occurred.”105 
By denying certiorari, the Supreme Court missed a clear-cut oppor-
tunity to instruct lower courts on whether it is permissible under strict scru-
tiny review to consider the purported reasons for a state law’s distinction 
between in-state and out-of-state products, or if instead, courts must first 
employ a facial textual analysis of the statutory language.106 The assessment 
of facial discrimination plays a crucial role in a Dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis because it determines whether the contested state law is reviewed 
under the strict scrutiny test or the much more lenient Pike balancing test.107 
As illustrated by the holding in Corey, future litigation on this issue will run 
into the same analytical dilemma because a strictly textual review of the 
lifecycle analysis employed in the LCFS could fall under the Oregon Waste 
Systems, Inc. definition of discrimination.108 
The Supreme Court had further reason to consider the LCFS due to the 
increased presence of similar state and regional fuel standards emerging 
across the country.109 Because section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act specifi-
cally allows other states to adopt California’s emission standards,110 a hand-
ful of state legislatures have already shown interest in enacting similar laws 
in furtherance of their own efforts to combat the negative effects of climate 
change on their citizens and environments. 111  In fact, in 2009, Oregon 
passed a bill implementing its own LCFS—based on the California law—
and, in the same year, a consortium of eleven states in the Northeast and 
Mid-Atlantic committed to creating a regional LCFS that will cover the en-
tire geographic region.112 With states preparing to enact laws that will fa-
cially discriminate against Midwest ethanol suppliers, it is likely only a 
                                                                                                                           
 105 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148 (quoting United States v. Taylor, 585 F. Supp. 393, 397 (D. Me. 
1984)). Table 6, therefore, serves legitimate reasons and is not merely geographic discrimination. 
See id. at 151. 
 106 Compare Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575–76 
(1997) (ending the discrimination inquiry once the Court found that the statute expressly distin-
guished economic entities based on geographic factors), with Corey, 730 F.3d at 1107 (looking 
beyond the text of the LCFS to find that it was not discriminatory even though it made express 
distinctions based on geography). 
 107 See supra notes 63–71 and accompanying text. 
 108 See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S 93, 99 (1994) (noting that 
“‘discrimination’ simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic inter-
ests that benefits the former and burdens the latter”). 
 109 See infra notes 110–113 and accompanying text. 
 110 See supra note 58–62 and accompanying text. 
 111 See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36.468A (West 2010); Memorandum of Understanding on the 
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic Low Carbon Fuel Standard, Between the States of Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, 
Rhode Island, and Vermont (Dec. 30, 2009), archived at https://perma.cc/H5DQ-3NNH?type=pdf. 
 112 See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36.468A. 
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matter of time before a surge of related litigation reaches district courts 
around the country.113 
CONCLUSION 
The majority and the partially dissenting opinion in Rocky Mountain 
Farmers Union v. Corey, when read in conjunction, expose the need for a 
clear judicial instruction from the Supreme Court on deciding Dormant 
Commerce Clause cases. The Supreme Court should clarify when state leg-
islation is facially discriminatory, but nonetheless allowable, after strict 
scrutiny review, and further, when the state can prove that the impetus for 
the law was a legitimate reason to employ such discrimination regardless of 
any textual discrimination. Although California’s Low-Carbon Fuel Stand-
ard represents a crucial step towards controlling greenhouse gas emissions 
in the fight against climate change, it should not have been permitted to 
evade strict scrutiny through an illusory finding that California’s cap-and-
trade law, AB-32, was not facially discriminatory, when it surely was. If the 
court had properly reviewed the statute under strict scrutiny, however, the 
law would have nonetheless withstood it, because of its legitimate local 
purpose and the inability to create the same effect through other, non-
discriminatory means. 
                                                                                                                           
 113 See supra notes 88–112 and accompanying text. 
